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A corporation is not an invisible,intalngible bCing,ex-
isting only in contemplation of law ; but is a body of individ&als
associated for mutual benefit, each one of whom has a distinct
autonomy and well defined rights mnd privileges. A stock cor-
poration is in reality,, a partnership, with certain additional
liabilities and exemptions. If a fraud is perpetrated, indi-
viduals are liable. If promises and representations are not
fulfilled, it is indivtduals who have failed to fulfil them. A
corporation is not a being, but a number of beings, none of whom
are invisible, intangibl e or imaginary.
A stock corporation may organize under a general law or
may be incorporated by a special charter. The general law or
special charter, or the proceedings thereunder, fix and determine
the number of persons hecessary to constitute the corporation,
the nature of the business, the method of its conduction, the
liabil~ty of i-s members, and the amount of the capital stock.
The capital stock of a corporation is expressed i$. terms of the
monetary unit,pounds or dollarsas the case may be, and is divided
into shares. the term is used in at least two senses. First,
as meaning the amount of stock,which the corporation is axthorized
to issue, and s3cond, the aggregate amount of stock actualli is-
sued. The capital stock is not the corporeal a37emts of the
corporation ; but may vastly exceed the actual assets as vice
versa,the actual assets may vastly exceed the capital stock.
Corporate stock has no existence uutil issued, andstrictly,
the term capital stock should be held to mean, the aggregate a-
mount of stock issued, and that only, "for the term stock as
used in the charter, before it is taken by subscription, moans
nothing more than a power in the directors to receive subscrip-
tions for stock" to such an amount. ( Sturgess v. Stetson(1858)
1 Biss.,246 : 10 Myers' Fed.Dec.,57.).
A share of stock is issued to a person, becoming a men-
ber of a corporation, in the form of a certificate, which repre-
sents his proportionate interest in the property and profits of
the corporation and the extent of his participation in the deter-
mination of corporate questions. It is issued as being of a
certain par valuation, ten, one hundred, one thousand dollars,
and, if regular in form, represents that the shareholder has
actually paid the par value thereof or has rendered himself ab-
solutely liable to the c orporation to pay the same within a cer-
tain time, upon proper calls, as the requirements of business
demand. Upon the basis of the num.ber and amount of the shares
of stock so issued, the corporation begins the transaction of
business and solicits the credit of the p-.blic in the enterprise
which it has undertaken.
The Question Stated.
What is the 4 effect of the issuance of a stock certif-
3.
icate as Ailly paid-up when, as a matter of fact, the corporation
has never actually received an equivalent of the par value t.hereof?
Stock certificates may .e is:ued qs paid-up, when not
so in fact, by three methods : by an issue for a part payment in
cash ; by an issue for property or labor at a false valuation ;
end b;' a stock dividend or distribution of shares of iunissued
stock among the stockholders. ( Cook on Stock artd Stockholders
2 ed.,§ 22. ).
Is the Issue Void.
If shares of stock issued at less than their par valua-
tion are not shares, which are within the power of the corpora-
tion or its directors to issue, as, for instance, where there has
been ani issue of an illegal increase of capital sto&k, the shames
have never had any legal inception, and the issuance is ultra
vires and void. The qiestion of whether the shares were issued
at less than par is imaterial. ( Scovill v. Thayer (1881) 105
U.S. ,143.). "A distinction must be made between shares, which
the corporation had no power to issue and shares which the caw-
pany had power to issue although not in the manner in which,
or upon the terms upon which, they have been issued. The hol-
ders of the shares which the conpany had " no power to issue,
in thuth .1a<L not-hing at all, and are hot contributors. "  ( II
Lindley on Part. ,138.). There are numerous dicta in the cases,
4.
stating in general terms that the issue of stock at less than
par is, under all circuistinces, illegal and void ; that such an
tssue is against public policy,a fraud upon the law and the public
But the better doctrine, and the one tacitly accepted, is, that,
except in case of an express statute or charter prohibition
declaring such an issue void, the issuance of legally issuable
stock at less than par does not ipso facto render the stock void.
At the most, it is only voidable at the suit of certain of the in-
terested parties. The decisions e--C dicta, which seen to
be in conflict with this proposition, are, for the most part,
cases invdlving a statutory prohibition, or some independent
question of fraud. In Spring Co. v. Knowlton 103 U.S.,49§and
Knowlton v. Springs Co.,57 N.Y. f/I ,issues of stock at less than
par under the provisions of the New York ITanufactarving Corpora-
tions act, were held void. In People v. Sterling M'fg. Co.,
82 Ill,457,the statute provided for an issue of stock "only upon
the payment of the full amount of such stock," and the Illinois
court heldthat, even though issued with the consent of all the
stockholders of the corporation, the corporation coulu not be cor-
pelled to transfer the sane on its books "the issue being illegal
and void." In Barnes v. Brown 80 N.Y.,527, the court said
"It is not claimed and could not be claimed, that the corporation
or its directors could create any valid stock by issuing the seine
without consideration," but the remark is dictum pure and simple.
5.
In Sturgess v. Stetson I Biss.,240, the stock of a co-poration
issued at less than par was held void, where an action was brou 9
by a stockholder against a person to whom he had agreed to trans-
fer part of the stock, to enforce the payment of a promissory
note given for the stock, although the stock was not yet deliver-
ed. Defendant set up- the fact of the stock being issued as
full paid at less than paras a special plea to ".pne bill of' the
.- a niff for specific performance. The demurrer to the plea
was over-ruled, the court saying : "The subscription of stock by
the plaintiff for less than the price of the shares fixed in the
charter was void, as against law and the power of the directors."
But the decision was really based upon the fraud of the vendor
of the stock in mis-representing its real nature to his trans-
feree, and did not, therefore, involve the legality or validity
of such an issue. The stock was not what the vendor had repre-
sented it to be. This was stfficient and the demurrer to the
plea was properly ovcr-rtled.
The Relation Between the Corporation and the Holder
of a Fictitious Certificate.
The corporation having issued the stock as fully paid-
up is, as between the holder and itself, estopped from repudiat-
ing its express declaration, and compelling the holder to perform
6.
a contract which he has never male. The holder cannot be com-
pelled by the corporation to contribute the par value of his
shares.
Scovill v. Thayer 105 U.S.
Zirkle v. Joliet Opera Co.,79 Ill.
Sawyer v. Hoag 7 Fed. Rep.,785,
Union Ins. Co. v. Frear Stone Co. ,97 Ill., 535.
Osgood v. King 42 Ia.,478.
Phelan v. Hazard, 5 Dill. ,45 : 10 Myers' Dec.
In Scovill v. Thayer 105 U.S., ,which is a leading
case on the question of the issue of fictitiously~paid-up stock
certificates, by agreement-made Lunder the date of the several
tssles of stock, the anounts paid thereon were credited to the
subscripber, and the balance e unpaid credited "by discount",
and certificatew as for full paid-up shares :iere delivered to
the subscriber, and the stock acaount between the company and
him balanced by such discount. Mr. Justice Woodin delivering.
the opinion of the c urt, said :
"The stock held by the defendant wast evidenced by cer-
tificates of full paid shares. It is conceded to have
been the contract between him and the conpany, that
he never should be called upon to pay assessnents upon
it. The same contract was made 4 with all the other
subscribers and the fact was known to all. As b4-
between them and the company this was a perfectly
valid agreement. It was not forbidden by the char-
ter or any ]law or public policy, and as between the ccm-
pany and the stock holder, just as binding as if it had
been expressly authorized by the charter. If the com-
pany, for the purpose of increasing its business, had!
called Wpon the stockholders to pay up that part of their
stock, which had been satisfiecd by discont, according
to the contract, they could have successfully resistod
7a
such a demand. No suit could il,,vlve be, n i.tlined by
the company to collect the unpaid stock for sbuch a pur-
pose. The shares were issued as fully paid on a fair
understonding qrid that bound tn'i-e companly. " And it
was held tPeft no action w-s maiiitainable ag-ainst the individual
stockholders on the part of the creditors until the i agreement
betweon the stockholders and the corporation was set aside as
in frauu of their rights. In Sawyer v. Hoag 17 Wall.,610,
the aourt said :"Undoubtedly this transaction if nothing unfair
Was intended was one Mhich the parties could do effectually as
far as they alone were concerned." In Flinn v. Bgley,7 Fed.
Rep.,785,a corporation issued stock as fully paid-up at two-
thirds of its par value. Judge Brown said :"All the stockhol-
ders of the corporation having assented to this arrangement,
it was evidently no fraud upon them, and the corporation would
be estopped to claim more than the agreed price." In Union
Insurace Co. v. Frear Stone Co.,97 Il1,535,action was br a cred-
itor, and one defense urged was, that a creditor has no greater
rights than the corporation. Upon this point the court said .
"As between t:tnselves(the corporation and its s:lareholders) any
contract fairly entered into would seem to be valid. At all
events, a corporation aill be estopped to say its contract is
ultra vires, and a e its stockholders upon obligations arisiig
by implication of law, tiv:.t it 1as onoe solemnml- waived." It
is true that the majority of the authorities are dicta for the
simple reason that the principle i3 so uncontrovertible that
such an action is rarely undertaken by t-he corporation.
The corporation as such cmot repudiate the contract,
retur, the amount paid for tie stock, and compel a return of the
stock. In Goff v. Hawkeye Pump Co.,(32 Ia.,091,an action was
brounght by a corporation to set aside a contract whereby it had
agreed to Qeliver stock certificates as full paid-up whe but
fifty percent had in fact been paid thereon. Upon this point,
the court said : " The public had the right to assume, where the
stock of a conpany has all been issued as full paid stock, that
it has been paid for in full.... but while this might be a ground
for proceedings in the interest of the public to wind tp the col-
pany, it is not a ground on which the plaintiff can predicate
his right to relief." Relief was denied bu.t partly upon other
grounds. Cook states, where fraud has entered into the trans-
action, as where property has blen transferred to the corporation
at a false valuation unknown to the directors, the corporation is
not estopped from having the agreement set aside. "The person
receiving the stock can then be compelled to return the stock,
or its market value, and take back t'Jiat which he gave,e the cor-
poration for it." ( Cook on Stock an.d Stockholders 2nd. ed.,
§ 38.). MJ-.Cook cites no authority to support the proposition,
but upon general principles of law f-v governing fraudulent con-
tracts, the dontrine would seem to be good.
If sued fo- the delivery of certificates, which the cor-
poration has fairly agreed to JAiver as full pai-up at less
than par, the corporation cannot set up, that the contract was
ultra vires; but if no action has been )rought by the non-partic-
ipating shareholders to set aside the agreement, the stock cer-
tificates should be delivered in accordancw with the contract,
and performance will be compelled by the court.
Terwillger v. Gt.Westrn Tel.Co. ,59 Ill.,249.
Otter v. Brevoort Petroleum Co.,50 Barb. ,47.
In the first case cited, a corporation contracted that,
upon the payment of forty percent upon each share, a full paid
certificate would be issuedthe delivery of which was'-ordered by
the court, although afterwards, upon the comany becoming insol-
vent, the sane stockholders were held liable to creditors for the
sixty percent remaining unpaid upon their shares. ( Bates v.
Gt.Western Tel.Co.,Ill.(1890),25 N.E.,521,and cases cited.).
In Otter v. Brevoort Petroleum Co. ,Otter contracted with the offi-
cers of defendant to purchase shares of their Stock as full paid-
up at twenty-five percent of the par v- value. There was a
failure to deliver two hundred shares, and this action was brought
to compel their delivery or the payment of their value. The
court said :
"It is said that public policy will not permit an incor-
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porated company to sell its oVm stoc&: for less than par.
The facts are not before the court to raise the ques-
tion mentioned. It has not been made to appear how
the company acquired the stocks It might have been
issued for property mi. acquired subsequently by the
corporation ; or it may have ! een forfeited stock for
the non-payment of subscription price.. ..If it were
otherwise, I am unable to perceive any rule of public
policy that requires the court to relieve the defend-
ant from a contract otherwise without objection, bind-
ing it to the delivery of shares in its capital for a
price below the par value." The decision is,
therefore, dicta Ton this point, for it did not appear that the
stock was an original issue.
Both parties to the contract are equally bound. The
stockholder cannot return the stock to the corporation and re-
quire the re-payment to himself of the amount paid for it. As
between himself and the corporation, he has received all he con-
tracted to receive. If )by the transaction , he has rendered
himself liable to the creditors of the corporation beyond the
amount which he actually paiu forthe stock, it is his own con-
cern. He is presumed to know the law and to have entered into
the contract with his eyes open.
As a business organization, why should not the cor-
poration bee allowed to enter into a contract whereby, upon an
adequate consideration, one of its members becomes entitled to a
larger proportionate interest in the profits of the concern
than the proportion of his stock bears to the whole stock issued ?
Independently bf its shareholders the corporation has no exis-
tence, and why, if such contract is not opposed by them, should
li.
it not be enforceable ? As in a partnership, the several part-
ners may agree t1Y-7t a member of the firm shall becomte entitled
to a large interests in the profits, though he has contributed
but a small portion of the capital, a corporation, by the acqui-
esence of all the shareholders, may enter into a contract whereby
a stockholder becomes entitled toe. a larger proportionate share
in the actual assets, than the proportion which the emount actu-
ally contributed by him as compared with the amounts contributed
by the other stockholderswould seem to entitle him. If all
the stockholders acquiesce, they are as to such transaction
nothing more than partners. In any aspect, I fail to see how
such a contract is against public policy or a fraud upon the pub-
lic. The cxporation would certainlFr have the right to issue
the stock at par,o-ly requiring a certain percent to be paid in
at the time of issue, the remainder to be subject to call. It
would certainly have the power to issue such stock to the same
persons to whom it has issued the paid-up certificates. In the
one case a special contract, in the other, a contract implied by
law, render the stockholder p liable upon the insolvency of the
corporation to contribute for the payment of its debts, the amoun;
remaining unpaid upon the stock. Wherein is the fraud ? In
each case, so far as creditors are concerned, the same persons
are liable to contribute for their benefit the same amount.
12.
The Relation Between the Corporation and the State.
Admitting that the issue by a corporation of ficti-
tiously paid-up stock certificates is an act ultra vires, never-
theless it is doubtful if such a transaction, especially where
free from the taint of fraud, is sufficient to justify a proceed-
ing in the nature of a quo warranto on the part of the state for
the forfeiture of the c orporate franchises. In State v.
Mina.Thresher Co.,41 N.W.,105, the court says :"If, as between
the company and its stockholders, there is a wrongful application
of the capital, or an illegal incurring of liabilities, it is for
the stockholders to complain. If the company is entering into
contracts ultra vires to the prejudice of persons outside of the
corporation, such as creditors, it is for such persons to take
steps to protect their interests. It should be borne in mind
that acts ultra vires may justify interference on the part of the
state by injunction to prohibit a continuance of the excess of
powers, which'would not be sufficient ground for a P forfeiture
in proceedings quo warranto." In Holman v. State ( Ind.1886)
5 N.E.,702,the subscriptions to the stock were made by persons
notoriously insolvent, and s ch facts being proved, the court held
that there was a mere nominal compliance with the statute, and
the writ of quo warranto was sustained.
It seems,therefore, in order to justify a forfeiture
13.
by a proceeding quo warranto or a proceeding in the nature of
a quo war'rnto, the acts of the corporation should be inconsist-
ent with the franchises ranted, and subversive of the business
for which it was incorporated. I do not think we can say the
issue of fictitiously paid-up certificates always constitutes
such an act. Certainly where the issue is for property or
labor at a false valuation, the issae could not be set aside
t
until the fraudcwas pr6ven ; or where the issue is for cash at
the market price of the stock, it is difficult to -ee aherein
the act is inconsistent with the franchises !ranted by the state.
The creditor is smfficiently protected in his equitable right
to recover of the holder, the balance remaining unpaid on
fictitious certificates. Why should the state interfere ? And
again, in many cases the issue of stock as full paid-up at less
than par may be of material benefit to all parties concerned.
What occasion is there for the state to interfere and declare
such an issue ultra vires and void2
14.
The Relation Between the Corporation and its Directors.
The directors of the corporation are its agents ,and
they are also trustees of the corporation and its s 4 ockholders.
If the trustee violates the trust to the prejudice of the ben-
eficiary, upon general principles of law, he is liable for the
violation. ( Chandler v. Bacon and others,30 red. ReP.,538,and
numerous cases cited.). If the shareholder beneficiary has
waived his right by acquiesence in the violation of the trust,
he is estopped frcm complaining. But what constitutes a vio-
lation of the trust ? Are we to hold that every issue of
stock for less than par constitutes ipso facto a violation, what-
ever be the circumstances attending its issuance, whether the
corporation be solvent or insolvent, whether for cash, or property
or labor ? While a wrongful issue of stock, which the di-
rectors might have rightfully issued, remains in the hanus of the
original holders, the corporation or its stockholders may have
the issue cancelled and the stock recalled, upon rayment to the
holders the amount paid to the corporation for the stock ; or,
if the stock itself has no legal existence, the issue may be
cancelled, by whomsoever held, and the stockholders are not pre-
judiced. But where stock which the directors might right-
fully issue, has been wrongfully. issued and has passed into the
hands of bona fide holuers, entitling them to a greater partic-
lb.
ipation in the affairs of the corporation than the increase of
the corporate assets should entitle them, then the only remedy
of the stockholders is to proceed against their directurs for a
violation of the trust. Where the corporation is in need of
fizids and unissued stock is issued by the directors at its market
value, it is ambnitted that no liability should attach. Such
I believe to be at least the tendency of the modern authorities.
The principle has never been asserted that the capital ztock at
its par valuation is a trust fund for the benefit of the stock-
holders. The market value of the stock fixes the real value
of participation in the corporate liabilities, assetS and profits.
It is difficult to see, how such an issue of stock at its market
value is ultra vires. If the stock is issued for cash at less
than its market value, then the directors should be held person-
ally liable to the corporation for the difference between the
market value of the stock and what they received for it. If the
issue is for property at an over-valuat(n, the same rule should
apply ( 49 N.Y. Super. Ct. ,197 ) ; but only upon proof that the
valuation of the property or labor was not made by the directors
in good faith.
If the stock is issued to the directors themselves
as paid-up, for cash, or as is more frequent, for property or
labor, the directors being members of a constructioni company,
10.
the corporation may have the issue cancelled, for the trustee
cannot occupy a position prejudicial to the interest of the ben-
eficiary. Gilman , Clinton & Springfield R.R.Co. v. KeR y,
77 Ill.,426,is a good ilustrative case. Certificates of stock
were issued gratuitously to a private construction company in
which the president and two of the trustees of the railroad com-
pany had a direct pecuniary interest. There was no fraud in
the contract, which, on the contrary, was advantageous to the
railroad company. The stock was of little orno value becau3e
of the large nixnuer of bonds existing as liens upon the load, but
was a majority of all the stock. Action was brought by a stock-
holder to have the issue cancelled, which wes sustained. The
decision of the court was upon the theory that the directors of
a corporation are the trustees of the stockholders, that being
members of a construction capany and receiving the 3tock gratui-
tously, they had violated their trust, and that, as in other
trusts, the beneficiary could ei ther ratify the contract and in-
sist iTon the advantage of itj or repudiate it altogether. The
latter he had chosen to do. In the course of the opinion, the
judge said : "The directors of a railroad company are, in an im-
portant sense, regarded as trustees for the stockholders, and it
woul14be a breach of duty to transfer that trust ; to assume
obligations inconsistent with that relation ; to place themselves
17.
in op-osition to the interests of f he stockholders, or in such
position where their own individual interests would Trevent them
from acting for the best interest of those they represent."
The corporation may, on the other hand, instead of can-
celli-g the stock, recover of the directors the difference
betv,;een the market value of the stock and what they actually paid
for it. The corporation, by institutin- the action, waives the
fraud involved in the issue of the stock, and the director is
compelled to pay the actual value of the stock approprizted to
himself. The principle seems similar to tfiat which allows
the plaintiff in an action of conversion to waive the tort anL
sue as upon contract for the recovery of the actual value of the
property converted, A The appropriation of the stock by the
directors, in fact, morounts to a conversion, and the irinciple
instead of being merely similar 2y be directly applicable. There
may be decisions holding the directors liable for the par value
of the stock, in-stead of the marliet :'-ue, where they :,.:'ve
issued the stock to themselves -s r:iemoers of a construction coT-
pany or the like, but I can see no logical reason for conpelling
them to pay to the corporation for the privilege of membership
a greater sum than it is actually worth. If, however, the ac-
tion is brought by creditors against the directors as stockhol-
ders, the situation would be quite different, and they might then
is.
be compelle d to pay the par value of the stock as was done in
Osgood v. King,42 Is.,478.
I will conclude the subject of the liability of direc-
tor.s to the c orporation and its shareholders by the revi;w of the
decision of a very instructive and interesting case,Fost.r v.
Seymour ( Cir.Ct.,S.D.N. Y.,1885) 23 Fed.Rep.,65. A bill was
filed br a shareholder of the Central Arizona Mining Co. against
the corporation and its trustees, to require the trustees to
account to the corporation for a fraudulent issue of the capital
stock. The stock was issued by the directors to themselves
as full paid-up for property at an over-faluation, the directors
being at the time the only members of the corporation. Plain-
tiff is an inrrocent holder of some of the stock. It was held
that he could not compel th directors to account to the corpora-
tion for the disposition of the stock ; and that the corporation
as such would have no cause of action against the trustees. A
very different question might have arisen if the plaintiff had
sued the directors as individuals for a fTractL in the sale of the
stock to himself ; or if t-ie action had been brought by a creditor
against the directors as stockholders. In either case they
might have been compelled to account. But the court said :
"There was no fraud upon the corporation..... The trustees were all
there was of the corporation. There were no stockholders unless
19.
they were stockholders., .,,It was not a fraud upon the stockhol-
ders, however, for there were none ; nor necessarily upon persons
subsequently becoming stockholders, because the stocf wv-s full
woev
paid stock a-d,,liable to any further calls in the hands of those
who might purchase it," nor, if taken by a bona fide holder lia-
ble to assessment for the benefit of creditors.
The Relation Between the Other Shareholders and the
Holder of a Fictitious Certificate.
If the directors of the corporation issue stock which
has no legal existence, as stock in excess of the mount author-
ized by charter, the issue is void. The stockholder may
brbng an action to have the isaec ancelled, whether the stock
be issaed for more or less than par, whether in the hands of
original holders or transferees, and whether he participated in
the issuance or expressly opposed it. The hilder of such stock
acquires no rights and subjects himself to no liabilities. The
stock has no existence in the eye of the law.
But where legally issuable stock is issued as paid-up
at les s.than par, a different question arises. I have already
noticed the liability of the directors to the corporation and its
stockholders. As long as the stock remains in the hands of the
original holders or their transferees with notice, the stockhol-
20.
ders of the c orporation, not participating in the issue, may cause
the issue to be cancelled, by paying to the holders of the stock
the amount at which it was issued. ( Fisk v. Chicago &c.R.R. Co.,
53 Barb.,513 : G.C. & S. R.R. Co. v. Kelly,77 Ill., 422.). They
cannot, however, compel the holders of the certificates to pay
the par difference betwea the par value of the stock and what
they paid for it. There is no trust relation as that which
exists between the directors and the stockholders. The stock-
holders have placed their agents, the directors of the corpora-
tion, in a position where they are presumptively empowered to
enter into such a contract. If, as a matter of fact, they have
no such power, and the contract was made without aithority, the
person honestly contracting with them should certainly not be held
upon a contract which he has never made. It seems just and
logical, that where legally issuable stock in the hands of the
directors, is issued by them at the market price, there should be
no right on the part of the non-acquiescing stockholders to have
the issue cancelled. The person purchasing stock at the market
price has paicL all that participation in the company is worth.
Of course, stockholders who participate or acquiesce
£
in the is sue of stock will not be heard to complain ( Knowilton
of
v. Springs Co.,57 N.Y.,518 ),and so also^the transferees of such
stockholders, who take the stock with all its incidents. ( M atter
21.
of Application of Syracuse R.R. Co. ,95 N.Y. ,. ). Such trans-
ferees are not, however, without remedy, for they may proceed
against theii, transferors for the fraudulent transaction-. (Coo-
lidge v. Goddard,73 1e.,578.).
The Rights of Creditors.
It is a doctrine which has been long established, and
frequently re-asserted in judicial opinion that the capital stock
of a corporation is a trust fund for the benefit of its credi-
tors ; that when a corporation contracts, it inrliedly represents
that its capital stock has been paid iT as provided by its char-
ter ; that it exists intact as a security for the payment of
debts, and will be so preserved, liable only to the dimt~nition
resulting from legitimate business losses. The general doc-
trine was first well established by Judge S~try in Wood v. D=m-
mer, and has since been followed in a long line of decisions. In-
deed, a court has gone so far as to sayl"it is not within the in-
genuity of man to devise a scheme to prevent a court of equity
from enforcing the payment of unpaid subscriptions to capital
stock, for the benefit of corporate creditors." In Wood v.
Dummer ( Cir. Ct.for Me.),3 Mason, 308- 32 3 (1824), a bank about
to dissolve declared a dividend of its capital stock, leaving the
0corlor-ation in an insolvent state. Plaintiff, bein- :. creditor,
brougzcht an action against several of the stockholders to recover
a portion of t.e dividend of capial stocl-, whic, had been re-
ceived ;V them. >xr.Justice $t ry said
"It appears to me vry clear upon gener-dl pri~ci.les as well
as legislative intention, that the capital stoc of banks
is to be deemed a pledge or trust fund "oi- the payment of
the debts contracted by the bank."
In S '.yer v. }Lag,17 Wall.,010 (1873) : 10 N,,,ers' r.c.Dec.,61,
the Sumreme Conrt of the U .ted States said :
"Though it be a doctrine of modern date, we think it now well
established, that the capital stock of a corporation especi-
ally its runpaid subscriptions is a trust fund for the ben-
efit of the gener l creditors of' tiie corporation."
In Upton v. Tribilcock (1875),l Otto,45 : 10 M.yers' ,ed.Dec.,108 :
"The capital stock of a moneyed corpo-,-.tion is a fund for the
payment of its debts. It is a trust fmd of wvhich the
directors are the trustees."
In %li.- v. Bagley 7 Fe,' .Rep.,785, Jud;-,e Brown says
"T'lrt the capital stock of a corporation is a trust fund
for the payment of its debts, and that the law ii-plie" a
promise by the suscrib r of stock to pay its par value.....
and that no subsequent re lease of their original contract
or subscription by the corporation will ;1vail against the
claims of creditors, are propositions too clearly establish-
ed to admit of question.
S-e also Sanger v. Upton 91 U.S.
Chubb v. Upton,95 U.S.,066.
Pullman v. Upton,96 U.S. ,72.
Hatch v. Dana, 101 U. S. ,205.
iaw1c-ey v. Upton,]0. U.S.,314o
County of l'organ v. Allen 103 U.S.,498.
Scovill v. T ,ayer,105 U.S.,
HI wkins v. Glenn 131 U.S.,31?.
RicharCson's Executors v. Grecn,1 3 3 U.S2,30.
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But ,l - i:; to 'v: considered t(Ke capital 3tock of a
corporation ? The :iatjOritT of tL, authorities do not attempt
a definition. I ciaintain thc rule should be, ti -t, o11- the
stock which is held out to t :e public as issued,and upon which,
actuall, or implied~y, the creditor relied as the basis of his
credit, is a trust fund. If, for example, the corporation is
prohibited blT its charter from commencing business oefore a cer-
tain amount of thie capital stock is subscribed, and the corpora-
tion conmences business, it is a fair assumption that the nec-
essary amount of stock has been subscribed and a liability incurl-
ed to pay its par value. As in the case of Sawyer v. Hoag,17
Wall.,610, the company was only authorized to conmence business
on a capital of loo,ooo dollars. Part of this was issued as
full Taid-ur when not so in fact. Very 1'roperly the capital
stock was held a trust fund for the benefit of corporate credi-
tors, whoo, from the fact that the corporation had commenced the
transaction of bvisiness, had the right to assume that the sub-
scribers had actu.llir contributed, or incurred an absolute liabil-
ity to contribute, the par value of their stock. It was the
express intention of the sta-.te that $100,0009 should be
contributec to commence the business, and upon the basis of
$100,000. credit was extended. If, however, thereA 4 never
been any representation, express or implied, that the capital
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stock is issued as fully paid-up, tnhn)upon no just principle of
law or reason con the capital stock be considered a trust fund.
If in its charter or certificate, and in all its published state-
ments, a cor, oration should repreaeat that its capital stock is
not to be assessable beyond fifty percent, the capital stock
I
cannot be considered a trust IAuld. Credit wai not extendedA
upon the basis of the par value oft he stock. A creditor has no
right to assume that the capital stock is fully paid-up in the
face of an express declaration that it is not fully paid up. In
such a case, the capital 3tock is not a trust fund, but at the mrost.1
fifty percent of the capital stock, for it was upon this alone
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that credit wefs extended,-upo- this alone that creditors lha the
right to rely for the p %ment of their debts. It is perhaps
unfortunate that the expression "the capital stock is a trust
fund" was ever enployed. In the early cases, it was used
with reference to the actual assets of the corporation, upon which
credit had already been given, as for instance, the stock which
had been issued. In Wood v. Dumer a dividend of the capital
stock was declared. In 3uch a case, tne capital stock was pro-
perly termeu a trust fund, in that it consisted of assets, which
the directors of the c orporation had no right to divert to the
prejudice of corporate creditors. But to term that a trust
fund, which has never been paid in to the corporation, which no
one has promised to pay, and which no one expects will be paid,
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would be absurd. The reason G4', Jieiae h-vinj failed the rule
k aAAkI
i-44 should fai. A careful examination of the nurerous
authorities convinces me that the reasoning of +,ie courts in
which t'e (,octrine has been sustained, rroc, es upon the theory
that because of the misrepresentation to the public, ti~e sharehol-
der is estopped from denying his liability for the par value of
the stock, and that, if he never promised to pay 100 percent
and no one had a rig?.t from tlhe representations of the corpora-
tion, to asste that he had so promised, he would not be liable
beyond the terms of his actual contract ; and the capital stock
would not, ther,-fore, in the sense of being the aggregate of
shares issued, be a trust fund for the benefit of creditors.
In Scovill v. Thayer 105 U.S. ,the court said : "It (the capital
stock) is so held out to the public whd have no means of knowing
the privite contract made between the corporation and its stock-
holders. The creditor has, therefore, the right to presume that
the stock suzoscribed has been or will be paid-up, and, if not,
a court of equity will, at his instance, require it to be paid.#
But what if creditors do not know the amount subscribed, or
knowing the amount, are aware of the conditions of its issue, is
it justice or common sense to say they can shut their eyes and
blindly stanmmer, "a trust fund. " Decidedly, no. T!:e direct
question has rarely arisen in ti]e courts. L, fact the language
oa- mav decisions would seem to negative the position, but for-
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tunately there are one or two authorities in which the modifica-
tion of the doctrine is stated in no uncertain terms. In Paper
Co. v. Waples,3 Wood 34 : 10 Myers' Fed.Dec.,165, an action was
brought by the trustees in bankruTtcy of an insolvent corpora-
tion to recover the unpaid balance of defendant's subscription
to stock. The charter of the corporation, which was required
to be recorded in a public office and published in a newspaper
at the domicile of the corporation, preswtribed the installments
by which forty percent of the subscribed stock should be paid,
and then declared that the residue, or any portion thereof, should
not be called for unless with the assent of three-fourths of
the stockholders, and then only to increase the business of the
corporation. Th court said"
uThe rule with regard to unpaid subscriptions to stock is
this : that whatever strn is subscribed by the stockholders,
and held out to the public as the stock of the corporation
is liable to be called in for the payment of its debts even
though the directors may refuse to make the call...... Now
looking at the charter of the La.Paper Co. ,what was the con-
tract which the public were advised the stockholder had en-
tered into with the corporation ? 11ot to pay their sub-
scriptions absolutely, nor to pay them when, in the discre-
tion of the directors, it might be necessary for the wants
of the company. No obligation was assumed to pay any more
than forty percent of the stock subscribed, unless upon the
vote of three-fourths of the stockholders, and then for a
particular purpose.....The stockholders have made their con-
tract with the corn oration, the public have been explicit-
ly advised of its terms, and the stockholders, therefore,
can on-ly be held to perform what they have agreed to do. The
company can claim no more, nor can the creditors of the cor-
poration sa they have been misled," anc. so recovery was
refused
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The case of Hill v. Silvey ( Ga. ,1889 ) 8 S.E.,808 con-
tains a full discussion of the subject. A bank was organized
under a charter which authroized the directors to receive sub-
s criptions to the amount of one million dollars, and made the
subscribers a body corporate when $200,000. was subscribed Wken
and ten percent paid in cash. Part of the sub:3cribers organized
in 1S72, 2400 shares of stock being represented in the organiza-
tion. The bank began business in 1873. In pursuance of
regular calls the stockholders paid fifty percent on their subscrbb
ed stock. On June 30th.,1873, a return was made to the gover-
nor, one of the items of vhich was 'Capital stock paid in $140,340.
This return contained no statement of the capital stock subscribed,
not paid in. In 1874 a resolution of the shareholders provid-
ed "that certificates of stock be issued to each stockholder on
an amount of s t ock as large as the sun actually paid in by him or-
her in cash, and that the capital stock and subscriptions be
reduced to the amounts actually'paid in." It was sought by the
assignees and rceivers of t1e co\rporation to charge the subscri-
bers to the full amount of the subbscriptions, as to fifty percent
of which they had been released by the above resolution. The
court after reviewing the authorities 3aid :
"Testing this case by these rules, it must be apparent that
the stock as originally shown by the subscription list, was
never held out to the world as the stock of the corporation,
and that the creditors dic. not rely, nor will they be legal-
ly presumed to have relied, thereon. No creditor has by
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his pleadings sought to set up such a claim ; they rest on
the naked fact that the subscription was made. To the ex-
tent of $200,000. , the minimum capital stock allowed by the
charter upon which business wvis to ioe conumenced, they cer-
tainly had a right to presumie that the stock had be en sub-
scribeCL. The fact alone of the commencement of business
created that p'l)suption, and to that. extent we have no doubt
that the stockholders were correctly heldl liable. But be-
yond that amount no such presunption arises. No act, no
statement of the corporation is shown by which it has ever
in any manner sought to mislead the public as to the real
amount of its capital stock."
The rule seems manifestly just : that only that portion
of the capital stock which, actually or impliedly, the corpora-
tion represents asrpaid in, and upon which, actually or impliedly,
the creditor relied as the basis of his credit, is a trust fund.
The creditor should not be allowed to complain that he has been
defrauded without beinr first compelled to establish that he has
been misled.
WHAT CREDITORS CIl COIPLAIN--- Where stock is lawfully is-
suable by thee corporation, and is issued as full paid-up at
less than par, onl~r creditors who bccome such after the issue,
and have, actually or impliedly, relied upon the issue as the
basis of their credit, should be allowed to complain. As to
existing creditors the transaction, far from amounting to a
fraud is to the amount paid for the stock an actual and mate-
rial benefit,tG th e. The unissued shares, which are within
the power of the directors to issue, are not assets. "They con-
stitute a part of the cpital stock, as provided in the charter,
29.
but in no sense are they 2tock." C Sturgess v. Stetson I Biss.,
246.). How then could the interests of I existiag creditors
be prejudiced by the exchanige of stock certificates, in themselves
worthless, for money or property, whereby the actuallassests of
the corporation are incre-ased ? Their credit ha:3 already been
extended. They did not conth-act in viecw- of the unissued and
worthless shares.
It is rather diffcult to determine the position of the
courts upon the subject. T. e general rule is broadly stated,
thqt where stock is issued at less thai par, it is a violation
of the principle that the capital stock is a trust fund for the
benefit of creditors. But what creditors ? It is often dif-
ficult to determine whether the opinion of the court proceds upon
the theory that the debt was incurred after, or before the
i sue. In i any decisions, however, in which the rule is thus
broadly stated, the credit was extenacd and the debt incurred,
subsequent to an issue of fictitious certificates, warranting the
court in its conclusion that the stockholder was liable for the
amount remaining inpaid upon his stock. But, however this
may be, I can conceive of no just reason for holding a stockhol-
der who has received unpaid certificates as paid-up in full,
liable to existing creditors of the corporation. Whatever may
be the effect of such transaction as between the state and the
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corporation or as between the oth-r stockholders and the holder
of the fictitious certificate, I insist that the existing credi-
tors have, in no view of the case, been prejudice(.L. It is simpl-
a transaction which is none of their business. In Flinn v.
B igley ( D.C.F.D. of Mich.) 7 Fed.Rep.,785, a case in which the
stock was issued at less3 than par, Judge Browm in speaking of
the transaction, says :
"Neither was it a fraud upon the existing dreditors, since
the assets of the debtor were increased by the amount of
mone. actLally paid in, and to that extent they were bene
efited by the subscription. It is then only as a fraud
upon future creditors that exception can be tqken to the
transaction. "
And in Handley v. Stutz ( Sup.Ct.U.S.,1891 ) 11 S.C.Rep.,50, the
same judge, now a justice of the supreme court, says :
"We have no doubt the learned circuit court held correctly
that it was only subsequent creditors who were entitled to
enforce their claims against the stockholders, since it is
only they who could, by any legd presumption, have trusted
the company. "
In that case an increase of the capital stock was duly made and
issued at less than par. The circuit court was followed by
the supreme court in holding, that those creditors were to be
treated as subsequent who had extended credit since t-1e time an
increase of the stock was ordered, and not from the time of its
issue and sale.
UPON WHAT DOES LIABILITY DEPEND.---Wheri the stockholder becomes
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a member of the corporation, entitleci to the rig1hts of arnoudter,
he enters into a rela'ion not only with the corporation but also
vith its creditors. By receivini the stock of the corporation,
he h-s publish d to the world tht he has pidL into the corporate
assets or renlLered himself absolutely liable to pay, the par value
of his stooe. II isL ther?!fre estopped from repudiating i lis
declaration, under a claim, that b:, a secret agreement with the
corporation or its directors, he 4-6 did not pay and never pron-
ised to pay the par value of his stock. He has made a repre-
sentation to the public upon which the creditors of the corpora-
tion have, presumably, relied, and the law will not afterwards
permit him-. to escape liability by aying, he did not know the law
and never believed the misrepresentation would render him liable.
His contract with the corporation is not alone for the benefit
of the corporation out also for the benefit of a third party,the
corporate creditor. The situation is this : both the stockhol-
der an. the corporation represent to the third party that they
have made a certain contract for his benefit, the terms of which
are as.follows. In reliance Ton the conttact as represented,
the third party extends credit to the promisee in the contract.
Whe'. the third party attempts to enforce the contract maue for
his benefit, both parties assert that such a contract wvvis never
made, notwithstanding their representation to the contrary. The
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situation would almost se,m to come within the doctrine Cstab-
lished b:, Lawrence v. Fox,20 N.Y., except^going a step further
and holding the parties to a contract wbich1 t!ey repre: ent them-
selves to have m &e. At s- nr rqte, t ,e courts h.ve held that the
promisor was estopped from denying tie terms of t-v contract,
which is 'mepresented -.s havinr- been made a.-d upon which the cred-
itor has relied. AnC this is true whenover a person becomes
a stockholder of a corpor-tion. The act of becoming a memoer,
ordinarily, is ipso facto - declaration of a contract for the
benefit of creditors, and even if there :e no contract in fact,
no subscription or other agreement wit' the corporation, but
merely the receipt of the stock, nevertheless the stockholder
cannot deny having made a contract Whith both:himnelf anc the
corporation have represented that he made, tiec orpo-.ation bY
declaring its stock issued, the stockholder, by the receipt and
acceptaxice of the stock. "When debts are incurred, a contract
arises with the creditors, that the capital stock shall not be
withdrawn or applied otherwise than upon their demands, until such
demands are satisfied.... It is publicly pledged to those who deal
with the corporation for their security." (Sanger v. Upton,
91 U.S.,56.). As the company could not sell its stock at
less than par, what was done amounte. in law toa subscription to
the stock and nothing else. It was true that the stock he took
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purported to be non-assessible, but that in law could only mean
no assessment woul be ma.e beyond hih percentage he has specif-
icaly boUnd himself to pay, Unless the legal liabilities of the
company require it." ( Hawloy v. Uptonj 102 U.S. ,31.), "The
stock subscribed is considered a trust und.....It is so held out
to the public who have no means of knowing the private contracts
made between the corporation anci its 3tockholdcrs. " ( Scovill
v. Thayer,105 U.S.,). "The original holder of stock in a cor-
poration is liable for unpaid- installments without dxoress
promise to pay them, and a contract betw'em- a corporation or
its agents, and him, limiting his liability therefor, is void
against creditors". ( Upton v. Tribilcouk 91 U.S. ). "It is
not material that there was no express contract or agreement on
the part of said defendeants to subscribe 9id pay for the increased
stock received by them, or that the certificates issued to them
therefor recited that the shares were paid up." ( Stutz v.
landley ( Cir.Ct.of U.S.,1890, Micl.D.of Tenn).
In Jackson v. Traer (1834) 64 Ia. ,469, a construction
company was a creditor of a corporation to the amount of $70,000
In payment of the debt, stock of the corporation was issued of
the par value of $350,000. Action was brought under the statute
by a creditor to compel a contribution of the remaining eighty
percent. Adms,J. says "the company seans to have proceeded upon
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the theory that steck which has nevr be n issued has a sub-
stantial existence as an asset of the company as stock would have
which had been issued and paid for, and afterwards acquired bY
the comapany." The statute of Iovra provides that the arnount
of capit al actually paid in must be kept posted in tie principal
place of businiess of the company, and the court argued that if
the company was permitted to issue its stock as full paid when
but twenty percent hiad in trutih be' paid, its posted represen-
tation would be a delusion. The judge then 3ays :
"Whoever subscribes for stock in an ireorporated company has
a right to assume that all subscribers, whether prior +
or subsequent, become such lon substantially the sane
basis..... It may be conceded, that it does not appear that
the stockholders entered into a written contract of subscrip-
tion.. ..... It seems probable that they :ecaye stockholders
simply by acceptance of the stock in question. That a
person may 3ecome a stockholder in this way is not denied
anc. could not be properly. The question presented then is,
as to what are the liabilities of the stockholder who be-
comes such without any subscription. Does he, by reason
of the acceptance of stock, become liable to pay for it the
price fixed therefor in the articles of incorporation ? In
our opinion he does. The principle involved has be n re-
pe-ited) y decided..... We have seen no case which recognizes
a difference betw: en those stockholders who become such in
pursuance of a written agreement and those who become such
by the mere acceptence of stock issued to them."
The decisions in a few jurisdictions, however, seem to
base the stockholder's liability solely upon his contract
with the corporation, and refuse to enforce, for the benefit
of creditors,a contract ;rhih the stockholder never made
with the corporation. In Sturgess v. Stetson, I Biss.,
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246 : 10 Myers' Fed.Dec.,57, the Ianguigc of the court was :"Stock
can be created only bYr contract, wheth :r it be in the simple form
of a subscription or in any other mode. There mIIst be an agree-
ment to take the stock and nothing short of this can create it."
But the decision ahich seems radically inc&isistent
with the great weight of American authorities is Christerisen v.
Eno, 106 N.Y.,97 ( followed in Christensen v. Quintard (Gen.T.
1s90 ) 8 Y .Y. Supo.,400.). On account of the high authority of
the court, I propose to examine at length the reasoning and si-
thoritie-s upon which the decision is based.
The St.Louis Bridge Co. issued its stock as paid-up
to the amount of $40.00 a share, no part of which was in truth
raif-. The company called in the remaining (30 fo upon the shares,
and apparently as an indaucement for the shareholders to pay the
amount, resolved to dist-ibute among them $1,000,000.00 of its
second mortgage bonds. No other consideration was given for the
bonds than the payment of this 60 % upon the stock. But these
bonds as well as the $40.00 per share pai U upon the stock were
substantially a donation or gift by the bridge company to defend-
ant. Action was by plaintiff as judgment creditor of the cor-
poration to charge defendant with the 40 / remIa1ning unpaid.
Andrer:rs, J. writes the opinion of the court. He says :
,The transaction by which he ( the stockholder ) acqLired t ,,h
shares as paid-up shares to the extent of 40 % of their nom-
inal amount, and received the bonds, created no obligation
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as between him and the company to pay the aount unpaid on
the stock or to account to the company for the bonds or their
proceeds........The plaintiff, to entitle him to the relief
demanded, is compelled to maintain that, as a creditor of
the corporation, he has rights si;Verior to the corporation
itself and may hold the defendant to account for the unpaid
forty percent on the stock as though he had been a subscriber
therefor, m-d for the proceeds of the bonds, as though he
had p rchased them of the corporation, or had sold them on
its account.
It is true that in this case the stockholder incurred
no liability to the corporation' ror the 40 X unpaid upon the stock.
As th the corporation, the transaction amounted to a gift pro
tanto of the stock, vrhich, if it chose to make, it might legally
do. As a creditor of the corporation, the plaintiff is com-
pelled to mainitain that he has rights siTerior to the corpora-
tion. If this were an objection to recovery, it might be urged
with equal force wherever there has been an issue of stock at
less than par, whatever be the circumstances ; or even where
there has been a bona fide subscription at par, and a subsequent
relea e of full payment by the corporation. In every such case
the creditor is obliged to maintain, that he has rights superior
to the corporation. Th re has been a misrepresentation by both
the stockholder and the corpo.Toration upon which he has relied.
Why, in justice, should his rights not be superior to the corpora-
tion ? As between the stockholder and the corporation, the
situation is entirely different. Each knows the actual condi-
tion of affairs, each knows the terms of their private contr act.
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By that, they should be bound. But creditors are compelled
to rely upon the representrttions, actually or impliedly, made,
and upon them they should kzve the right to rely.
Judge Andrews then says :
"We :Ire of opinion that the forty percent credited onl the
twenty five shares of stock issued to the defendant Eno,
cannot be considered and does not constitute a trust fund
applicable to the paynent of creditors. The capital of a
corporation consists of its fi-nds, securities, credits and
-roperty of wratever kind it rossesses. The word "capital"
applied to corporations is often used interchageabl with
tn- words capital stock, and both are frequently used to
express the same thing, the roperty and asssets of the cor-
poration."
The co..t .....
Ah court es' n* -end the term capital
stock, when used in connection with this subjedt. It is never
used -s symonomous with assets. In the tr majority of cases
in which the "capital stock" has been held a trust land for the
benefit of creditors, it was not an assest of the corporation.
Captail stock does not mean the actual assets, but the represented
assets, which may be quite different in amount.
Continuing, tie court said :
"There is no pretense that defendant Eno ever subscribed for
the twenty five shares of bonus stock ( so called ), or enter-
ed into any engagement to pay the forty percent crediteL
thereon. This was distinctly contrary to the intention of
all parties. The plaintiff seeks to charge him as though
he haL, subscribed for the stock and entered into a contract
with the company to pay the forty percent. We aee no
gro nd upon which he can be made to respond to the creditors
of the corporation as upon an unpaid subscription......The
liability of a shareholder to pay for stock does not arise
o-at of his relation, but depends upon his contract, express
or implied, or upon some statute, and in the absence of
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either of these grounds of lia ility, we tLo not perveibe how
a pe-son to whom sh'ires have been issued as - gratuity has,
by accepting them, committed any wrong upon creditors, or
made himself liable to pay the norrnal face of the shares
as upon a subscription or contradt."
"The plaintiff seeks to charge him qs though he had
subscribed for the stock and entered into a contract obligation
with the corporation to pay the forty percent." Precisely so,
but not because he has ever made a contract with the corporation
to pay, but ilecause he has represented, or at least acquiesced
in the representation, that he has agreed to pay the par value
of the stoc-. True he never subscribed for the stock in the
sense of signing a subscription list, but he took the stock and
became a stockholder, presumably participating in the management
and profits of the concern. Ti-e stock was presented to
him as p aid to the extent of forty percent. He accepted it and
as a stockholder paid the calls 4 upon the stock for the addi-
tional GO Y. If) as a fadt, defendant had subscribed for the
stock)in a technical sense, and the corporation as part of the
same contract had -ee-a&e6 -m agreed to issue the stock as full
paid-uxp for sixty percent of its par value, it is difficult to
see how the situation would be material y chsuged. In each case
the c orporation - resents him with forty percent of the par value
of the stock. In neither, i d he contract to pay l.ore than
sixty percent of the par value. How then, upon the reasoning
of Jmge Andrews could defedUant, in any case, be held to pay
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for the benefit of corporate creditors more than h2 has contractLd
with the corporation to pay. Aid yet th great weight of Amer-
ican authority holds the subscrib(.r liable, where ipon a subscrip-
tion for stock, the stock is issued as full paid-up ,pon tne
payment of 60 N of its par value.
In Jackson v. Traer (supra), the court said : "7le have
seen no case which recognizes a diference between those stock-
holders who become such 6n pursuance of a written agreement
and those who become such by the mere acceptance of stock issued
to them," and the same doctrine has frequently been asserted by
the United States courts.
Judge Andrews seems to lay great stress upon the fact
that the shares were issued as a gratuity in the first in3tance,
and urges that the liability of the stockholder does not arise out
of his relation,ubut depends upon his contract,express or im
plied. "  And so in truth it does depend upon his implied con-
tract, but not his contract with the corporation. The court of
appeals may restrict the decision of Christensen v. no to the
facts of that case and hold that the only point of the decision
was, that a girt and receipt of stock do not render the stock-
holder liable for the par value thereof, but the reasoning of the
opinion Woula seem to commit the court to the -ep-ne position,
that if the liability is not one which is enforceable bY the
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corporation ( which would constitute it L1 Actual asset ), the
creditor is without rerneuy.
The decisions cited to support the orinion of JuLdge
Andrews are Seymour v. Sturgess, 26 T..,134 : In Re gestern of
Canada Oil Co., L.R.,1 Ch,Div.,ll5 : Waterhouse v. Jamieson,
L.R.,2 H.L.(Sc.),29, no'one of which supports the decision,
but, on the contrary, all of them san consijtent with tie Amer-
ican authorities.
In Seym-o-Lr v. Sturgess, an action was brought against
the defendant as shareholder in the Boston and lew York Coal Co.,
a foreign corporation, by the plaintiff, acreditor of the conpany,
to compel defenant to pay the balance remaining unpaid upon his
stock. The c orporation was orgnized under the laws of M.ary-
land. 2:.Uxc was issued, and calls made up to 65 %. The
company i-. pursuance of the power given by its charter, enacte ,
by-laws one of which was to the effect, that the directors should
have power to make calls ana require payments, but no call should
be made unless there should be five affirmative votes in favor
thereof. Defendant became possessed of certain shares by
purch- se fron the corporation at $1.75 ncnL $4.00 per share,
"subject to the further rayment of $35.00 per share", and the cer-
tificates were issued in that form. Defendant also purchased
one hundred shares of a stuckholder and received lire certificates.
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This action was b'ought under the laws of New York, which per-
mitted dcmestic creditors to comaece s t its ag.inst the debtors
of a "beigi corporation, anc, recover any suns due the plaintiff,
"which such defendant or defendants could be liable to pay in
any event in the state or goverinent where such corporation is
locate." It was held, that without a call ol the directors,
as provided by the by-laws, made in accordance with the Mary-
land charter, defendant was not liable for the thirty-five per-
cent remaining unpaid. Upon a careful consideration, I do not
think the decision would be otherwise even in th. United States
courts, where the case has been, criticiseu ( Webster v. Upton
91 U.S. ). The law of New York provided for the enforcement
of debts, which such defendant would have ,een liable to pay
by the lex domicilii of the corporation. Under the laws
of Maryland, defendant would not be liable to pay without a call
of the directors, and so under the law of New York, the court of
appeals held he would not be liable without a like call. The
decision does not, therefore, seem to be inco nsi tent with the
waeight of American authority.
In In re Western of Canada Oil, Lands and Works Co.
(185) ,L.R. ,l Ch.Div.,115, the appell~nts we e the Canadian di-
rectors of an English company. A i erson named Walker entereu
into an agreeent with the company to transfer 
to it certain pro-
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perty in exchange for a certain sum in cash and a certain numb,,r
of the full paid-up certificates of the company. WalJJer appli u.
to the appellants to become directors, which they agreed to do
upon the transfer to them of a sufficient numioer of Lll paid-up
shares to qualify them. The number necessary to qualify was
five, but after the completion of the purchase, thirty full
paid shares were allotteu to each. *"No shares in the company
were ever allotted except shares al]otted to Walker or his nom-
inees as fully paid-up shares." One of the appellants affida-
vits was,RI would not have acted or as3unmed to act as a director
unless I believed that a sufficient humber of the ftlly paid-up
shares.....would h ave )een transferred to me. "  In a winding
up proceeding, the Master of the Rolls directed that appellants
be placed on the list for thirty unpaid shares each. Upon
appeal to the chancery division of the High Court of Justice,
the order was reversed. It does not appear that appellants
knew as a mat -er of fact, that the stock was not full paid, nor
that they did not receive it from Walker ( an allotment by the
company under the direction of Walker, rafounting to the same thing
as an issue to him and a re-transfer by him to appellants ) as
bona fide holders. If such was the case, the decision is con-
bistent with the great mass of American authority and does not
suport the reasoning of Christensen v. Eno. The court said,
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per JaiesL.J. :
"T-r.se shares formed part of the shares which had been agreed
to be given to Mr.Walker in part rayment of his purchase
money, and I think that the caje cannot be distinguished
in point of legal result from what it would have been if
the shares had been formally registered in the nue of
Walker, and then transferred by Walker to the directors
in rursuance of Jhis agreement with them." Precisely so,
and if they received then bona fide:, believing them paid-up,
tpon no line of reasoning could they be held liable. I do
not know either, as i-timated by the court, that there was any-
thing necessarily fraudulent, in a director acepting stock from
a stockholder of the corporation, as a gratuity. What I do
insist, and *hat is said by the court, is, that the issue to the
appellants was not an original issue from the corporation, and 4-4
does not, therefore, support the p1roposition for which it is cited
in Christensen v. Eno. The court goes on to say :
"If that had been done in form which was the substance of
the transaction, it appears to me that it would have oeta
impossible to treat the shares in the hands of Walker's
transferees otherwise than as paid-up shares \v'hich Walker h d
aot Iran the company, and which had been transferred from
Walker to the directors. And if so, and if the transfer
was bona fide, the law is clear and the decision is entirely
consistent with the Ancrican authorities. True, the t .ansferoes
never made any contract with tli ccrpjmany, 1Irncd true, tcey ,'r -. e
not liE le to pay t! e anunut unpaid on their certificates, but
he jne is not 'fe legal result of the other, s s - s to have
been thought by Judge Andrews it Christensen v. Eno, There
is a great deal of' dicta in the opinions o[ the judges in refer-
ence to what they s>(2m to regard as a breach of trust on the
part of the directors in accepting the stock, but, from the facts
'in the reported case, it is rather difficult to discover fraud on
their part.
In Waterhouse v. Jamieson (1870),L.R.,2 H.L. (Sc),29,
there is some dicta to support Christensen v. Jno, but it is dicta
pure and simple. The real question as stated by the Lord
Chancellor was : " Whether or not a pe'son taking shares in a
company established under a deed, which recites, ho'uever uitruly,
that 100,000 pounds has boen paid, and engaging, by his signature
to tnat deed, to meet all the contributions which remain to be
levied, but which are not to exceed five pouids a share, the rest
having been paid--wIether, moreover, a rerson hav:in purchased
shares in the market on which the repre'sentation is that one
hun-dred poun s has been paid iT upon rach share, and receiving
certificates of those shares sign d by the directors themselves,
,who were competent to act in the matter, ad who gave such certif-
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icates stating that 100 pounds per share had be; n paid up,
can afterwards at the instance of th' creditor of the company,
who discovers that in truth no such payment has ever been made
by the original holders of the shares, but that in reality the
shares had been taken and issued to the public withoat the fact
being known, that while they were 105 pound shares, only five
pounas or some very small an-ount, had been paid upon them, whe-
ther such shareholder can be sued on behalf of the creditors of
the ccmpany for the 100 pounads per share which remains unpaid" ?
In a winding up proceeding, the House of Lords held, that
defendant was not liable. There is nothing involved in the
decision of the case, which even remotely supports the decision
of Christensen v. Rio. One of the judges also said, in
speaking of the official liquidator under tIe companies ea
act :"He is appointed for the purpuse of assisting the court
in the winding up of a company, but in all his proceedings,
he appears to be merely susbstituted for the company." And
another member of the court said :"I take it to be quite settled
that the rights of creditors against the shareholders of a companY
when enforced by a liquidator must be enforced by him in right of
the company ...... The liquidator, therrefore, standing in the iace
of the company, the question is, Las he a right to recover in
the right of the company that which the company could not for one
moment, as against a bona fide shareholder, be entitled them-
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selves to recover." If the liquidator under the companies acts
only represents the company and stands in its shoes, we cannot
regard the action as having been brought by a creditor, as
would be the case in America, where action is brought by the re-
ceiver of an insolvent corporation.
So much for the decisions upon which Christensen v. Eno is
based.
Recent English Authorities.
In view of the fact, that Christensen v. Eno was at-
tempted to be based upon English authority, it might be inter-
esting to review the recent English decisions upon the subject
of the issue of stock for less then par. The two decisions
cited decided simply, that a bona fide transferee of certificates
issued by the company as full -dAd, is not liable in winding up
proceedings to the official liquidator, who, as stated in the
opinions, has no rights superior to the corTloanY. What the
decision of the court would have been if the official liquidator
had n regarded as representing the creditors, does not ap-
pear. The later English decisions, however, treat the liquida-
tor as the representative of the creditors, and the statement,
that he stands merely in the shoes of the company, must be re-
garded as dicta.
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The next decision was that of In re Ince Hall Rolling Mills
Co.( 1882 ), L.R.,23 Ch.Div.,545, before Chitty,J. Stock was
issued ;s full paid-up at a discount of 10 %. The court held
that the official liquidator could not compel payment of the
10 X, and that, if the issue was ultra vires the stockholder
could not be held, for the contract must be set aside inoto ;
basin- his decision upoon In re Dronfield Silkstone Co., L.R.,
17 Ch.Div.,76, 97, which held, that if the company cannot ques-
tion the transaction, neithr can a creditor. The court thus
admits that the action by the liquidator is equivalent to an ac-
tion by a creditor, but following the dicta in earlier cases,
holds, that the rights of the creditor cannot be paramount to
those of the company. The decision is, therefore, squarely
in conflict with the American doctrine.
Section 25 of the Companies Act of 1867 rrovides that,
"every share in any company shall be deemed anc taken to have
been i"?sued and to be held subject to the paynent of the whole
amount thereof in cash unless the same shall have been otherwise
determined by a contract duly maue in writing, and filed with the
registraVof joint stock corpanies, at or before the issue of
stock." It seems to have been thought that a registry
under this section would allow the issue of shares at less than
par, even though not otherwise alloweu. In Addlestone Lin-
oleum Co.,(1887), L.R.,37 Ch-Div.,191, stock was issued as full
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paid-up at 25 X discount. The contract was not registered
under §25 of the Companies Act of 1807. The appellants paid
75 % on their shares. In %inding up procedings they were placeJv
on the list of contributors for 25 % unpaid, which they raid, mnd'
now ask the court for leave to prove against the company as dam-
ages on breach of contract to the amount of such 25 %. It is,
therefore, not denied that the appellants are liable for these
calls for the *enefit of creditors. It was held in the lower
court that they couldd not claim in competion with creditors in
the winding up proceedings, and also that § 25 of the Companies
Act did not pennit an issue at less than par, but merely, if
the issue was not for cash the contract should be registered. The
case of In re Ince Halls Mills Rolling Co, L.R.,23 Ch.Div.,
545, and In re Plaskymaston Tube Co,Id.,542, in which it was held
that shares in a limited company were issuable at a discount,
were disapproved. The appellate court affirmed, and Cotton,
L.J. said he doubted whether an issue at a ddscount would be
valid. The decision, while diaapproving In re Ince Hall &c. Co.,
cannot be said to over-rule it, for the sane question was not di-
rectly involved, but as the opinion is that of the High Court
of Appeals, it should be entitled to considerable weight as show-
ing the tendency of the Thglish courts.
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In In re Almada 3nd Tirito Co. (lS2),L.R.,38 Ch.Div , the
company issued the stock to be held as shares of ono pound each,
with 18 s. credited as paid thereon, upon the deposit of one
shilling per share, making the sum of 19 s. credited as paid on
each share. Tie contract was duly registered. Allen, a
shareholder, moved before justice Chitty, that his name be strick-
en from the list of shreholders, and the amount he haci paiC re-
turned to him, upon the ground that the contract was ultra vires
and void. It was held upon appeal, that it was the theory
of the Companies Acts of 1862 and 1867, that the par value of the
stock should be paiu in ; that § 25 of the act of 1867 wt s intend-
ed to refer only to r ayments in property &c., an did not author-
ize an issue at a discount ; t vat thj order be 7-anted to strike
petioner's name from the list of shareholders and t at the one
shilling paid on each share be returned to him. This case
is said to over-rule In re Ince Hall Rolling 1!ills Co. ,L.R. ,
23 Ch.Div.,542. The decision, therefore, was, that the con-
tract to issue shares as full paid-up at less than par is ultra
vires nd void, and mayr be set aside at th-e suit of the stockhol-
der, even though both the 3tockhol& rr and the corporation are
fully cognizant of its terms. The court does not decide,
whether, if Allen had waited until a Winding up proceeding aa d
had been placed on the list of aontributors by the i ficial li-
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quidator, he would be liabl- to p-<r for the norit of creCitors,
the amount unpdi (I on his certif icates. While it is stated that
the case over-rul. s In re Ince Hall Rolling Mills Co.,L.R.,
23 Ch. Div.,542, the question invc>ved in that case did not arise
here.
In re London Celluloid Co.,(1888),L.R.,39 Ch. Div.,190, an
English Ccon-4any issue(, its shares to a French company for ce--
tain services. Part of them were taken b,, a director of the
French conrTpny and re-transferred to diroctors of the English
companp . The opinion of the court proceous upon the theory,
that neitl:er the directors or the French conpany nor +heir trans-
ferees, thc d~rectors of the English corrrany, .vere bona fide
holders, but were acquainted with the facts of the is-ue. T11
liquidator of ti-e English coul, any upon winding up ( the contract
not having be n registered) sought to hold appellants for calls
upo-n the stock. The liquidator was -mstained, an& hel ,that
liability There issue is for services could only be escaped by a
duly register-d contract. The decision is merely, that
unless a contract for the issue of stock for property, is regis-
tered, the stock will bc presumed to have ,ecn i.szued for cash
at p a'.
There se ms to be no settled English doctrine upon he ques-
tion, of whether the stockholder, having received shares of 3toa]
as paid UT _,t less than par, and not having had the contract set
aside as u-i1+,--a vires, is liable to the cor1 or- +.ne for the balance
unraid on his stock. There are intirna t .ions in t d -c'isions,
tha+. if he neglects to have t.o contract set asid i until ;'rinding
up jroceeLiJ.s are eoaeri.ced, he will be e liable, but the
only decision squarely i-ivolving the question is that of In re
Ince Hall Rolling Mills Co. (l582), L.R.,23 C.Div.,545, which
held :a:the stockholder,"not liable.
Many American courts have 1 misapprehended the effect
of the English authorities and nave cited t L.,n. iudiscrii-Linatel-,
without a careiul analysis of thie points involved. The opin-
ions of the EnAglish courts uoeoi thiis subject -re r mbling an . de-
sultor'v, aoounding in conflicting statements and dicta, and
should only be cited after a careful analysis of the facts.
THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES.--- (a),Where issue is for cash.
Where an i.so of stock certificates as full paid at lejs
thli- par, is :,ade upon cash payrments, and the stoc. is held a
trust fund, the measvxre of damages in a suit by creditors, or
by a receiver as reprasenting tfro creditors, is an anirount suffi-
citnt to satisfy tlicir tLLbts, not exceeding in the .gLeg.te
the difference .,et';.reen the pa r value of the stock and what was
paid for it. The princIj le hias been so frequently re-iterated
and enfor. ccd, thait a citation o' auithorities is unnecessary.
(b) Whe -e issue: is for p'ro]verty.-- Stock. can only bc ijssueu
for pro] erty, labor or s2.rvices unddi provisions of statute or
charter. A long line oL decisions i daer the -:w York manufac-
turing colrorations act ( now the business corporations law ) h.1s
hel d, that xhire an issue is for prop erty, labor or services,
creditors can only recover beyond the amount actually exchanged
for the stock upon proof of two things : first, that the value
of t".e property, labor or services was actually less than the
par value of +he stock issued in exchange ; and second, that the
over-valuation was rLac'e by the directors deliberately and fraud-
ulently.
Boynton v. Hatch, 47 N.Y.,225.
Schenk v. Andrews, 57 N.Y.,133.
Boynton v. Andrews, 63 N.Y.,93.
Douglass v. Ireland, 73 N.Y.,100.
Lake Sup.Iron Co. v Drexel, 90 N.Y.,87.
National Tube Co. v. Gilfillan (N.Y.Ct.App.,
1891 1, 26 N.E.,538.
Nor is it alone in New York th: t the rule has been thus
stated. In Phelma v. Hazard 5 Dill. ,45 : 10 Myers' Fed. Dec.,
64, Dillon, J. states the rule : "The contract is valid and bind-
ing upon the corporation and tne original sharetal-ers, unless it
is rescinded or set aside for fraud, and that, widle t ~e contract
remains unirroeached, the courts, even where the rights of cri-
tors are involved, will treat that as rayrment, which the parties
have agreed should be payment." In Young v. Erie Iron Co.
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(Mich.,1887),3 1 N.W.,814, the stock was origiiall,; issued for
mining property, as w-s claimed, at a fraudulent valuation.
Fraud was not shon but only mistaken juigment. Two of the
judges wre of opinion that the issue was valid, there being no
fraudulent intention shown.
Fraudulent r- is generally a iu-stion for
the jury.
Brockway v. Ireland, 61 How.Pr.,372.
Knowles v. DuffY, '0 Hun 485.
Thuriber v. Thompson, 21 Hun 47.
But is may te inferred from the absurd difference between the
par value of the stock anu the actual value of the property for
whichl it was tiaken., In Bornton v. Hatch, C3 N.Y.,95, the
court said :
"It cannot be questioned that where prop :rty, the value of
which is well known and understood, or ca.pable of neing
e-sily ascertained, is taken at a most exhorbitant estimate
far beyo.,d reiy inltrinsic and real value, it raises a stronigc
rresumption that the valuation is not in good faith, mad
was made for a fraudulent purpose. This presuTption will
be conclusive unless it is rebutted by evidence which fully
explains the apparent bad faith." In this case, the value
of the prop erty being shown, a--. t.':e amourt of stock issued for it,
the court directed a verdict.
The question then is, where stock is so issued and
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tI.e fraudulent ovrr-valuation. rovon, w.,t is tiie measure of' C:li-
ages ? If,
Cool. in hJ work on, ; anu Stock.hol ..ers states,'
that where stock is VIA-WL for property at an ovcrvaluation,
the stoc1holder should not be held liable for ti-e difference be-
tveen ti.e , ,r vaue of the stock and what he paiu for it, out that
tiie contract is to be tre:ited like oter fraudulent contracts,
adopted in toto or rescinded in toto and set aside. ."The
prowl, erty or its value is to be teturned to the person receiving
the stock and he must return t-e stock or its real value. Its
real value is ascertained not by its par value but by its selling
market value. (2ni. ed.,§ 47).
I admit., tL-t such should be the rule if further payment
should be attempted to be enforced by the corporation. As
between the stockholder and the corporation, the relation is con-
tractual, aqd the corporation cannot both !.ccept and repudiate,
prcbate and reprobat.e, a contract at one a, d the same time. The
directors of the corporation are its atiorized gents. If
both ti.e directors and the stockholders trans>eirving the Fro-
nerty are aw'are oi it.s overvaluation, botn are in pani delicto,
a-ni. the courts will not make a cntract 0 "r But as to
cr-edit Ors the relation of the s dhhxv.J r i 2 not .\ontr"ctualobut
is based ul on a principle of estoppel. If, knowi: ,,lY, Ce 
ac-
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quiescs in the repy- sentation of the corporation tha" he has
paid the par value of his stvak by tho exchange of labor or
services, he is a pa ty to a misrepresentation by which the cred-
itor is, presumably, deceived. I fail to see whe 'ein there
should bo- an, legal distinction between an issue for property
and an issue for cash. If one is fraUdulent, so likoise is the
other. If one should either be accepted or repudiated in to-
to, so also should the other. When the issue is for cash, the
contract of the corporation with the stockholder is, that he
shall not be held to pay beyond a certain percent. By this the
corporation is bound. As to creditors, even Mr-Cook admits,
-the stockholder is estupqed from settlng up his contract with
the corporation to defeat recovery,
I do not think the authorities cited by Yr.Cook support his
position. There is some aathority in England , that the rights
of the creditors aic not superior to the corporation, nd 17.
Cook may have followed h those decisions. Of the other cases
cited, in Con.Tel.6oV. 'Telson, 49 N.Y. Super. Ct.,107, an action
was brought by the corporation against the diiectors for a fraud-
ulent issue of stock, ard they were held liable to the difference
between the market value and what they received for it. This
was entirely just. The corporation had be.-n injured to that
e 4 It is only as to creditors, that the par value of the
stock is held a trust fund by estoppel. In VannCott v. Van
Brunt,632 N. Y. ,537, action was brought by plaintiff as receiver
of a corporation against Van Brunt to recover the difference
bet,;een the par value of stock received b, him ( he being pres-
ident and director ) and the actual value of property and labor
furnished under a construction contract. It did not appear
that the construction contract was fraudulent, but :'athjr other-
wise, nor tha the value of the work done and materials furnished
was less than the fail' and just value of the stock, or that the
road built and equipped was worth less than said stock, nor does
it appear from the i'aported case, that, as a matter of fact,
the value of the raad was less than the Par value of the stock
issued for i ts cons ruction. The reasoning, however, proceeds
upon that theory. The court says : "The important question to
be determined in this case is, whether the defendant, Van Brunt,
was liable to pa.- for the stock held by him for which he di not
actual).: subscribe, at the par value thereof. But *pay" to
whom 2 The corporation or its creditors ? The action
although brought by the receiver seems to be brought as and for
the corporation against its director, for misconduct as a direc-
tor, and. not for misconduct as a stockholder. If brought b:'
the corporation, and it did not appear, that the property was wotth
less than the fair and just value of the stock, there 
was merely
U;,.
a fair exchange ofv for value, of which the coiporation as
such cannot complain. It may be, however, that in this case,
as generally, the receiver must be regarded as representing
the creditors as well as the corporation, for the court says :
"It is diffdcult to see how creditors could be defrauded when all
the property which the coroany ever had remained in its possess-
io-1 aid under its control",which is also true of every issuance
of stock, and upon the same reasoning a shareholder could never
be held liable beyond his actual contract with the corporation,
whether such stock be issued for cash or property. The in-
issued stock is certainly not property, and its issuance never
diminishes the actual assets of the corporation, but its issuance
in exchange for either cash or property, not wurth the p5r value
thereof, may be a flse representation as to actual assets. The
decision in Van Cott v. Van -.runt certainly seems difficult to
reconcile with the athorities holding, that th2 anount unpaid
on the shares is a trust fundf or the benefit of creditors. The
case of Osgood v. King 42 a., 478 is squarely in conflict with
the decision. ( See also 63 Ia., 3 3 3 : 7 S.W.,276 (Mo) : 36 Fed.
Rep. ,54.
RECENT VODIFICATIONS OF T:E ,OTRITE.-----The Mining Cases.
It has been held in what -ire known as the mining cases,
that becaise of the peculiar methods of forvming mining corpora-
tions, such corporations arc sui generis, and that there is no
liability upon the shareholder to pa,; -ie par value of the stock.
The public a-,, suplpose& to know that the capital stock does not
represent assets, but that a part, at least, reprsents meyoely
the speculative value of a newly discovered vein or lode, and has
been issued to the prospecter in exchange for his interest. The
certificate is merel. an index of his right of participation in
the profits and management of the enterprize. That is all, and
the public are supposed to be cognizant of it. ( In re South
mount~in Consolidated Mining Co. ,14 Fed.Rep. ,347.). In Young
v. Erie Iron Co. (Mich.), 31 N.W., 814, the stock of the corpora-
tion was issued in exchange for mining property, as was claimed,
at a fraudulent valuation. Action was brought by a creditor upon
a judgment against the corporation to enforce the payment of the
full par value of the stock. Two of the judges, following the
decision in 14 Fed.Rep., based their opinion upon the following
reasoning : "An exception to the principle, that the capital of a
cQrporariOn is a trust fund to which creditors can rcsort for pay-
ment, is recognized in some states in favor of mining corpora-
tions, based upon the universal knowledge 
of the custom of such
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corporations to have a very large nominal capital and to issue
such c apital to its full aount as paid-up, but -u disp se of it
for what it will bring in the r"arket."
Bdt with the exception of mining co~>prations, h courts
have, until recently, rigidly held to the general rule, ',hat
whatever be ho circumstances attending its issue, whether the
corporation be solvent or insolvent, an issue of stock certificates
at less than par is a fraud upon the creditors of the coi-pora -
tion ; and altho.gh the question of whether the ru-le applied to
existing or fL1-' --e creditors or both was not brought squarely
before the courts, the reasoning of the opinions would se T. to
include existing -s well as subsequent creditors. The court
in Jackson v. Traer(184),C4 Ia.,484, seems to have attained
to the ne plus ultra doctrine. "The true theory is, that the
capital stock of a corporation is fixed with reference to
its supposed largest needs, to be all subscribed, and to be
paid for in cash at once, or to be called for from "ime
to time, in successive installments, as the actual needs
of the co!poratipn require. Whenever a corporation has im-
prudently coimenced business, and incurred hazards, witia
partial and insufficient amount of stock taken, and can
dispose of no moresstock at par, such corporation is ordinar-
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ily a source of danger to the public, and when such, ,he
sooner it is wound up the better. The courts certainly
should not aid to prolong its existence by methods which the
statute does not contemplate."
The reasoning of the court is radical and absurd. The fact
thqt a corporation's stock is below par in the market does not
necessarily argue, that the corporation is unprosperous and the
only proper method of disposition is to wind up its affairs. On
the contrary, many prosperous concerns may be unable to dispose
of their stock at par. A concern may be in great need of cap-
ital to prosecute some particular enterprise. This can only
be obtained by the issue of stock, which the directors are empow-
ered to issue. The stock will only sell at 95 Y of the par
value on the market. Is the corporation helpless ? Is it
a menace to the public ? Should it be wound up at once ? A
few thousand dollars may place it on a firm business basis,
and yet no one will pay one hundred dollars for what is worth
but ninety five. In such a case the rigid application of the
doctrine, that the par value of the capital stock is a trust fnd
for the benefit of corporate creditors, mao- lead to great hardship.
Why is not the market value of the stock of itself a sufficient
notice to creditors, that the stock is not selling at par. I
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can see no justice in holding that a certificate upon which
95 X has been paid, issued a-: full paid up, should be liable to
the additional 5 %, 'hen the market value of the stock is but
95 X.
Mr.Just-ce Brown ( then Judge B3rown ), appreciated the
hardship of the situation, when he wiote the opinion in Flinn v.
Bagley, 7 Fed.Rep. ,785. A corporation became embarassed foi-
wqnt of finds and determined to increase its stock. The court
said :
"As its existing stock however was worth only 2-3 of its par
value, it was obviously impossible to sell its new stock at
par, since all the stock would stand upon an equal footing
and no one could be found to pay a dollar for what was worth
but 6B and 2-3 cents. There was, therefore, no recourse
but to issue new stock at its real value. All the stock-
holders of the corporation having assented to this arrange-
ment, it was evidently no fraud upon them, and the corpora-
tion would be estopped to claim more than the agreed price.
Neither was it a fraud upon existing creditors, since the
assets of their debtor were increased by the amount of money
actually paid in, and to that uXtent they were benufite. by
the subscription." Action was brought to coirpel the
payment of the 33 and -1-3 Y unpaid. The aurt sustained the
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action, but with great rcjluctance. "This case is certainly
a hard one upon the defendants. Finding th. company embarrassed
for want of funds, they agreed to subscribe a certain s .rn and take
in pa..ment stock at what it was really: worth. It is a hard-
ship, however, from which I see no wa-, of relieving them consist-
ent with the views of tlf supreme court in HIaley v. Upton."
A case arose in the United States district court for
the southern district of Iowa ( Clark v. Beaver, 31 Fed.Rep.),
in which a railroad corpo'ation was insolvent and its stuck worth-
less. Defendant was a creditor of the conpan:r to the amount
of $70,000.00 for construction. Stock was issued to in pya-
ment of his debt, as full paid up at 20 cents on a dollar. The
debt was discharged and the stock was taken by defendant in hopes
of thereby tiding dver the insolvency of the ceapany. The at-
tempt being unsuccessful, 
-pon the insolvency of the corporation,
the creditors brought an action against him for the amount re-
maining unp.pid on his stock. It was held that he was not lia-
ble, and that the rule, that the capital stock at its par value
is a trust fund does not apply to such a case, and that not-
withstanding that the debt upon which the suit was brought was
incurred subsequent to the stock transaction. The judge crit-
icises the case of Jackson v. Traer as laying down a too broad
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and sweeping rule. Is not the exception just and salutary ? A
corporation is in a stite of actual if not public insolvency. If
by some means an individual can be induced to accept its stock
as full paid-up upon the payment by him of a certain percent,is
not the transaction manifestly an actual and material benefit
to the creditors of the corporation ? The rissued shares
ai-e not assets. By their sale, even at a small figure, the
actual assets of the corporation are increased, and by so much,
the amount to be divided among creditors. In the case of
Clark v. Beaver, there was not es-s more to divide, but a smaller
number to share, which is practically the same thing. I
can conceive of no R just principle upon which Clark should have
been held to contribute to the claims of the other creditors. He
relinquished his right to share in the gross assets of the d0r-
poration and received in return the privilege of sharing in the
net assets, the existence of which the financial condition of the
corporation forbade. Would it not be inconsistent to compel
him to contribute further to the gross assuts, wl.en by his con-
tract with the corporation, he has deliberately relinquished
his right to a participation in a pro rata division of the same
assets2 The court said :
It is argued.... that the debt u4oon which the present suit
is founded was contracted subsequent to the transaction
between Green and the corporation, and that the reasoning
of the court cannot be soLund when aP llied to the plaintiff
in this case...... If the transaction between George Green
and the corporation was at the time beneficial to the credi-
to's of the corporation then existing, and if it was, there-
fore, legitimate, I am not able to see how it could be ren-
dered invalid by debts subsequently contracted. The judge
then goes on to reason that the whole transaction was public and
open to creditors. It seems to me, however, if, as a matter
of fact, the debt was contracted subsequent to the issue, and the
stock was t issued at less than par, the decision of Clark v.
Beaver, while just as I believe it is, is in conflict with the
reasoning of the great weight of decisions, 2.ncluding those of
the supreme court of the United States, and that no amount of
fine spun argument and legal 4A-i refinement can satisfactorily
distinguish them. The case, however, was affirmed uon appeal
to the supreme court ( 11 Sup. Ct.Rep. ,1891 ), lr.Justice Harlan
writing the opinion. The decision in the storeme court, it
seems to me, lFroceeds upon the theory that the debt was incurred
before the issue, and that its payment with certificates of no
value in themselves was an actual benefit to existing creditors.
The court says " It is also certain, that the acceptance by
,the members of the construction company of worthless 
stock in
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full discharge of the claim was a b,-nefit to both the existing
creditors anCd the holders of stock of the railroad company,
not paid in full." The court severely criticizes Jackson v.
Traer, 64 Ia., 409.
The Supreme court of the United States having once got
started in the right direction did not hesitate. The decision
of Clark v. Beaver was handed down Tarch 2,1891. March 30,
1891, the court handed down the decision 'n Handley v. Stutz,( 11
2.C.Rep.,-30). A corporation was organized with a capital of
$120,000. ,with power to increase to $200,000. The enterprise
was the mining and sale of coal. Some time after the organiza-
tion, the company was led to believe that its coal would coke. T1t
coal was of -n inferior quaility and the prospect of the corpora-
tion in the business of mining and selling coal was not bright.
In order to embark in the enTerprise of coke burning, money was
required, and it was determined to issue $50,000. of the company'3
bonds, which was done. But the bonf s would not sell. It
was then suggested that the capital stock be increased to $200,000;
that '0 ,000 be given as a gratuity to the purchasers of the bonds,
and that the other 30,000 be distributed among the stocil:holders,
which was done. Plaintiffs were judgment creditors of the cor-
poration, and filed a bill in equity against the corporation
an- the stc-ckholders receiving the increased stock to compel
C C.
pa ment theofor, the company beir+r in the hands of a receiver an(,
its operations stopped. The c±:'cit court held the defend-
ants liable to all the creditors of the corporation, whose Cebts
originated alter the alleged increase of stock, and fixed the
date of such increase. As to debts contracted priur to that
date, the-Y were excluded because as between the company and the
stockholders, the latter held s4ki stock properly m-nd without lia-
bility to the company, and all creditors who dealth with the con-
pany prior to such increase aid not upon the faith of such stock,
had no equity to demand more than the company itself coald. The
case at Circuit is reported in 41 Fed.Rep.,531. As to the stock
distributed among the original stockholders, the court decides
that the holders are liable. >s to the stock gratuitously be-
stowed upon the p uchasers of bonds, Jackson, J. says :" it is
claimed for them that neither the company nor the old stockhol-
ders could enforce such a liability upon or against them, and
that the creditors can assert no better or sqwerior rights." Aft.Y
reviewing the authorities, the circuit judge decides, that such
defendants are liable equally with the :ecipients of thj stock
distributed, and that there is no valid distinction between the
receipt of stork ( upon an increase ) by the o-riginal stockhol-
dei.s or b-I new bond holders. The judge criticizes the case
of Christensen v. Eno,106 Y,97. Upon appeal to the supreme
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COUrt of the United States, the decision of the cir'cuit court
was affirmed as to the stock distributed among the old stockhol-
ders, b ft it was hel d, that the defendant bondholders, who had
received the full-paid stock as an
the bonds, we:.e not liable for the
ion is bj Nr.Justice B3rown. As
the former stockholders, the court
Upton v. Tribilcock, and the cases
receivinp the stock are liable for
what different considerations appl,
the bonds of the company with the
to receive an amount of stock equal
inducement to their subscription."
ind.cement to the purchase of
par value thereof. The opin-
to the stock distributed among
holds, upon the authority of
following it, that the persons
its par value. But "some-
to those who suoscribed for
understanding that they were
to the bonds, as an acLditional
The corL't then reviews the
facts leading to the issue of the bonds, and says :
"The case, the7;, resolves itself into the question whether
an active corporation, or, as it is called in some cases, a
'going concern' finding its original capital impaired by loss
or misfortune, may not, for the purpose of recuperating itself
and providing new conditions for the successful pposecution of
its business, issue -iew stock, put it upon the market and sell
-f-. hi best price that c-sn be obtained." The judge -.hen
dtingishCS the prior supreme co-.,zt cases in '-he follOvilg
language •
"In those cases, the dfcndants we 'u ei.ghtr uo inal s iosci-
b,3's to Iih Inciuascd stock, a, a price fa: belov its par
value, or t1ansfo e s of such s,bcribe:-s ; and .he stock
was issued, not as in this case, to purchase property or
raise money to add to he plant and facilitate the opera-
tions of ;he compan>,, but simply to increase its original
stock, in order to carry on a l arger business, and thc stock
thds issu ed wvas treated as if it formed a part of the orig-
inal capital... ...It frqently happens that corporations,
as well as individuals, find it necessar" to inci'ea. e their
capital in oruc.- to raise money to prosecute their busines
successfully, and one of the most frequent methods resorteu
to is, that of issuing newVi shares of stock and putting them
upon the market for the best price that can be obtained ;
and so long as the transaction is bona fide, and not a mere
cover for watering the stock, amd the consideration obtainc3
represents the actual value of such stock, the courts have
shown no disposition to disturb it.....The liability of a
subscriber for the par value of increased stock taken by him
may depend somewhat upon the circumstances under which and
the pu-rposes s fo_ which such increase was made. If it
be merely for the purpose of adding to the original capital
stock of the corporation and enabling it to do a larger' and
more profitable business, such subscriber would stand prac-
tiaally upon the same basis as a subscriber to the original
capital. But we think that an active corporation may,
for the purpose of paying its debts and obtaining money for
the successful prosecution of its business, issue its stock
and dispose of it for the best price that can be obtained. As
the company, in this case, found it impossible to negotiate
it s bonds at par without the stock, and as the stock was
issued for the purpose of enhancing the value of the bonds,
and was taken by the subscribers -o the bonds at a price
fairly representing the value of both bonds a d stock, we
think the transaction should be sustained, and that the de-
fendants cannot be called "on to respond for the par value
of such stock, as if the: had subscribed to the original
stock of the con-FanY."
And so wher- Judge Brow'rn of the District Court, in 
Flinn v.
Bagley upon almost precisely the same 
state of facts, failed to
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dis-iguish the snprermie court decisions, Justice Brown of the
STreme Cort of the United States found no difficuity in breaking
down the ba-riers of Hawley v. Up,on. There is no doubt that
the case is inco, sistent, if not with the decisions, at least
wi 1h he -easoning of foirnu cases in the s .Treme court. The
cis ii is a striking illustration of what is sometimes called
judicial legislation, and exempqlifies the present tendenc: of
,he cors to favor and promote corporate enterprises, leaving
coirporate creditors, like individual creditors, to look after
their own interests, without additional legal protection.
THE PURCHASE OF ITS OWN STO K PY THE OPPORATION.---The law re-
quires that the capital stock shall be issued once, and but
once for par. If sL'bseque1.iiJ to the first iss.J, the direc-
tors of a co p oration go inLto the market and purchase their own
stock with the accumulated profits of the concern (where the p-r-
chase of stock is properli within the power of the corporation),
there is nothing fra.ld-ulent in the conpany afterwards selling the
stock at its market valne, hther above or bolov pr'. I h
thoee is no m-sapplica-ion of the fLuids of the collporation in the
purchase of the stock, creditors cannot be 1rej 'ctLced b a fair
sale, nor is such sale in any way a false representation to the
public. The corporation has once received its par value in cash.
This is sufficient and the law is satisfied.
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TRA iSFEREIS )p ORIGINAL 1HOLDERS. It is unly ho u-iginal sub-
and t1eir assignees with notice
scribo-js to stock issucc as full -paid-tip, fictitioisl j, who can
be heILL liable for the amount remain._nF npald ujpon the certif-
icates. A transf,. oc of the stock who .1-chases it for a val-
uabli corisid.ration and vvithoLt notice, I'elying upon the re-
res-ntation of he corporation, that its pay, value is full> paid,
ta es it re1leased from all liabilities. ( Yolung v. Erie
Iron Co. (Yich.lS7) 31 :I .W.,81 : Foreman v. Biglow 4 Cliff.
541 : Cook on Stockholders,2 ed.,§ 50.), and even where a .rans-
feree has notice, if there has butn an intervening bona fide
holder, he is not liable. ( In re Stapleton Colliery Co.,L.R.,
14 Ch.Div., A32).
What amounts to a represeniation on the art of the company,
is a question of law, which may be difficult of accision. For
instance, in the case of Webster b. Upton, 91 U.S., "non-assess-
ible" stamped -uoon the face of the certificate was held not to be
a rorresentation b, the corp any, thavtho stcck was fully I aid in.
In an' case -he transferor remains liable and ma - be suLed b.T
a credito-' precisel" the same as if he had never transferred his
certificates.
PROCEEDINrGS AGAINST STOCKHOLDERS. A corn t of cquity may make
a call upon the stock, the gh the di-,c )L, of the c o!Joration
refuse, o- in the case of fictitioisl paid .Lp certificates, have
not hio right to do so.
Before the creditors can resort ;o the individuals
shareh,,lders, an action must be first brought against the corpora-
tion as such, the claim reduced to judgment, and an exectL ion
thereupon retn-ned unsatisfied. The corporation as distinct
and independent .f its shareholder-s is primarily liable for its
obligations. The shareholder can only be held to pay the amount
remaining unpaid ori his stock, when the business requirements of
the corporation render it necessary, and not until execution is
returned unsatisfied is it conclusive, that the actual assets of
the corporation are insufficient to satisfy the obligations of
the creditor.
It has bee-n held in qre- York, that all the shareholders
must be joinec. as defen.ants in an action brought by a creditor
( Griffith v. Matgam, 73 0.Y.,GIl), but in -he United States court
a different rule obtains. ( Hatch v. Dana, 101 U.S.,205 :
Wood v. Dummer 5 17ason 308 ).
The corpor-ation itself unlesd defunct should be a made
a p arty def endant. ( Wood v. Dummer- 3 1'ason 30S).
It has been held in the United States courts, that the
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judgment will be pro rata paymnnt, in the proportion which the
stock held by the deferwsnts bears to the whole capital stock,
unless it appears that 1ie stockholders not joined are insolvent
or without the jurisdiction of the court. ( Wood v. DI-ter,supra).
The action may, in a proper case, be maintaiied by the
receiver of the corpor'ation, who represents riot onli the stock-
holders but also the creditors.
The action may also be maintained by a single creditor
for the benefit of all.
TABLE OF ASES.
Addleston Limoleum Co. ,L.R. ,37 Ch. Div.,191. . .... . . . . 47.
B athes v. Brown, SO N.Y. ,527 ........ . .
Bates v. Great Western Tel.Co.,(I1l.), 25 i.E.,521. ...... 9.
Boyton v. Andrews, 63 N.Y. ,93 ................ 52.
Boyton v. Hatch, 47 N.Y. ,225 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52,3.
Brockwa, v. Ireland,61 How.Pr.,372 .. . . . ..... . 53.
Chandler v. Bacon, 30 Fed.Rep.,53. ............. . 14.
Christensen v. Eno.106 N.Y. ,97 ............. 35,45,46,66
Christensen v. Quintard,(Gen.T.,N.Y.),8 N.Y. Supp.,400.. .. 3. 5.
Chubb v. Upton,95 U.S.,6QG. .... . . .00*......
Clark v. Beaver,31 Fed.Rep : I! Sup.Ct.Rep. . . . . . 02,03,64,65.
Continenta.l Tel.Co., v. Nelson,40 T.. S-per.Ct.,197. . . . .15,53.
Cook on Stock and Stockholders. . . . . . . . . . . .. 3,8,54,70.
Coolidge v. Goddard,73 Me.,57S ................ 21.
County of Morgal v. Allen ,103 U.S. ,493 . . . . . ......
Douglas v. Ireland,73 N.Y.,O0 ................. 2.
Fisk v. Chicago &c.R.R. Co. ,53 Barb.,513, ........... 20.
Flinn v. Bagley, 7 Fed.Rep.,785 . . . . . . .... 7, 2,0,61,8.
Foreman v. Bigilow,4 Cliff.,541 . .. . . . . . .. .. . 70.
Foster v. Seymour,23 Fed.Rep.,65. .. . .. . . . .18.
Gilman, Cli nton &c.R.R.Co. v. Kelly,77 II .,426 . ..... 16,20.
Goff v. Hawkeye Piunp Co. ,62 Ia.,691 ............. S.
Griffith v. 1ang q,73 '. Y.,61. ............... . .71.
Haridley v. Stutz,(Sup. Ct.,U.S.),ll Sup. Ct.Rep.,0 . ... 30,33,65.
Hawkins v. Glenn,131 U.S.,39 .. .. .. .. . .. 22.
Hawley v. Upton,102 U.S.,314. ........... . 22,33,62,69.
Hatchi v. Dana,lOl U.S.,205. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 22,71.
Hill v. Silvey (Ga.),8 S.E.,808 . . . . . ...... 27.
Holman v. State (Ind.),5 N.E.,7O2. .... . ... ..... 12.
In re Almado & Tirito Co. ,I.R. ,38 Ch. Div., .1........49.
In re Ince HalI Rolling Mills Co. ,L.R.,23 Ch. Div.,545,47,49,50, 51.
In re Loncion Celluloiud Co. ,L.R. ,39 Ch.Div.,190. . . . . . . . 50.
In re Plaskymaston Tube Co. ,L.R. ,23 Ci.Div.,542 . .... . . 48.
In re South Mountain Con. Co.,14 Fec.Rep.,347. ....... . .58.
In re Stapleton Colliery Co. ,L.R. ,14 Ch. Div.,432. . . . . . . 70.
In re Western of Canaca Oil Co. ,L.R. , Ch.Div.,115. • . . • 40,41.
Jackson v. Traer,04 Ia.. . . . .a o . . . . . . .33,39,59,65.
Knowles v. Duffy,40 Hun 485. . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . 53.
Knowlton v. Springs Co. ,57 N.Y. ,518. . . . . . ..... . 4,20.
Lawrence v. Fox,20 11.Y. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. . 32.
Lindley on Partnership. .......... • ........ 3.
Matter of Application o1 Syracuse R.R. Co.,95 N.Y.,1 .1 .... 21.
National Tube Co. v. Gilfillan (N..),26 N.E.,538 ....... 52.
Osgood v. King,42 Ia.,478. . .. . . ... ... . .. 6,18,57.
Otter v. Brevoort Pe troleun Co. ,50 Barb.,47. ....... . .9.
pser Co. v. Waples,3 Wood 34 . .. . .. . . .. ..... 26.
People v. Sterling 'fg. Co.,82 IJ1.,457e * * . * * * *
Phelaxi v. Hazard,5 Dill.,45 ........ . . .. . . . . 6,52.
PulJ1man v. Upton, 96 U.S.,328 ........ . . . . . . . 22.
Richardson's Executors v. Green,133 U.S.,30. . &
Saiger v. Upton,91 U.S. . . . . ...
Sawyer v. Hoag,7 Fe6L.Rep.,785. . . . . ...
Schenk v. Andrews, 57 N.Y.,133. . . . . . ..
Scovill v. ThEV er,105 US.,143o . . . .a .* .
Seymour v. Sturges s, 26 IT.Y. ,134. . . . . ....
Springs Co. v. J{riowlton,103 U. S.,-49. 12
State v. 1$inn. Thresher Co. ( Minn. ) ,41 .. W. ,1025.
Sturgess v. Stetson,l Biss.,246. . . . . ....
Thurber v. Thompson,22 Hun 472. . .. . .. .
*. . . . .. . 21 .
. .. . . .22,32.
.... 6,7,22,23.
. . . . . . 52.
* . 3,6,22,25,33.
. . . .. .. 40.
* . . . . . . * 4.
*. . . . .. . 12.
* .. . 2,5,29,34.
. .. . . . 53.
Ter-ry U. Muiger 121 NJ.Y.,61 . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 a .17.
Terwill gr v. Gt. Western Tel. Co. 59,111. ,259. .... .... 9.
Union Ins.Co. v. Frear Stone Co.,97 Ill.,535 . . . . . 2,7.
Upton v. Tribilcock,l Otto 45* . ..... . . . . . . . .22,33.
Van Cott v. Van Brunt,82 N.Y.,537. . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.
Waterhouse v. Jamrieson,L.R.,2 H.L.(Sc.),29. • • 40, X.
Webster v. Urton,91 U.S. ........ ... * .. . 71.
Wood v. Dnizmer,3 Mason 308. .. . . . . . . . . . 21,24,71,72.
Young v. Erie Iron Co.,(?,MicL. ),31 I.W.,814. .. . . 53,58,70.
Zirkle v. Joliet Opera Co.,79 Ill...... . .. . .6.
Lake Superior Iron Co. v. Drexel,90 N.Y.,S7. ........ . 52.

